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Suburban State Legislators and
School Finance
Keith A. Boeckelman
Western Illinois University
Much contemporary
research suggests that suburbanites
constitute a relatively distinct political group given their
comparatively
strong support for low taxes and local
control of government
services . This article considers
whether suburban preferences
in the areas of taxation
and local control affect state policy decisions on school
funding . Specifically
examined is the proposition
that
suburban state legislators
are more likely than those
from urban and rural areas to oppose educational funding plans that use statewide taxes . The analysis begins
with a case study of Illinois, but includes comparisons
with three other states. A number of tentative conclusions
are drawn from the analysis , including the observation
that partisanship
seems more important than region in
explaining
suburban
legislators'
voting patterns
on
school funding.

T

he migration from cities to suburbs has been one of the
most notable demographic developments of the postWorld War Il era in the United States. While scholarship
of the 1950s and 1960s showed that suburbanization had little
impact on political behavior, more recent studies have called this
conclusion into question. Contemporary research suggests that
suburbanites are distinct in that they are especially likely to supAUTHOR 'S NOTE : I would like to thank the APSA's Small Research Grant Program
for its support of this research . In addition, Sara Snowden, Keith Lewandowski, and Bart
Ellefiitz all deserve thanks for their assistance in the preparation of the manuscript, as do
the two anonymous reviewers for their extensive and helpful comments .
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port low taxes and favor devolution of services to local levels of
government (Gainsborough 2001).
This article considers whether suburban preferences in the areas of taxation and local control affect state policy decisions on
school funding. Specifically examined is the proposition that
suburban legislators are more likely than those from urban or
rural areas to oppose educational funding plans that use statewide taxes to equalize resources. The analysis begins with a case
study of Illinois. Due to the limits of case studies in reaching
general conclusions, comparisons with three other statesMichigan, Georgia, and Maryland-are also included.
BACKGROUND

Historically, conflict among regions has played an important
role in shaping state policy choices (Palmer 1972). During the
first two-thirds of the twentieth century, urban-rural tensions defined many intra-state political battles. According to Key, ''the
differences between metropolitan people and the outstaters form
an enduring basis for party competition ... " (1956, 230). Before
the Supreme Court's Baker v. Carr decision, rural areas often
had the upper hand, as "malapportionment in the states imposed
serious handicaps on the states' capacity to deal with contemporary social issues" (Palmer 1972, 32).
After the states redrew their legislative districts according to
population criteria in the 1960s, metropolitan areas gained
greater representation in the legislatures. As a result, policies that
responded to urban concerns found greater favor (Van Horn
1996, 2-3). Meanwhile, however, the balance of power in metropolitan areas themselves was changing, as suburbs grew in population, and many cities lost residents. As of the 1990 Census,
over half of the U.S. population resided in the suburbs, and suburban legislators accounted for a majority or plurality in many
legislatures. According to Nardulli (1989, 16), the result has been
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the emergence of "a new regional force in state politics, one that
looks as imposing as the burgeoning cities of a century ago."
In purely demographic terms, then, the suburbs appear to be
well-positioned to exert political power. Nevertheless, there are
at least two reasons why they may not dominate legislative policy decisions. First, suburban interests may be too diverse to allow a cohesive coalition to develop. While some suburbs may fit
the stereotype of well-off, homogeneous enclaves, "the suburban
bloc includes a growing number of aging towns beset by urban
migration, fiscal scarcity, and a whole range of problems not too
different from the cities they adjoin" (Erhenhalt 1993, 8). As a
result, Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom (2001, 232) believe
that suburbia will not speak with one voice, and that political
coalitions pitting urban areas and older "inner" suburbs against
more recently settled areas are emerging. Given their size advantages, cities would probably retain the upper hand in such coalitions.
A second factor that may limit suburban power is that suburban legislators may not promote a regional agenda. To begin
with, legislators may not respond directly to their constituents'
concerns. While Rosenthal et al. (2003) argue that constituency
preferences are a key factor in determining legislators' votes, a
study of school finance votes in the New Hampshire legislature
found that legislators often voted against their constituents
wishes (Campbell and Fischel 1996). The increasing prominence
of interest groups in state legislatures, documented by Thomas
and Hrebenar (1999) may reinforce any tendencies toward nonresponsiveness. Specifically, Weir (1995) argues that rising interest group influence in state legislatures has undermined the
power. of regional coalitions.
Whatever regional conflict does exist can manifest itself in a
number of areas. In this article, I focus on education finance,
specifically efforts to equalize funding among richer and poorer
VOL. 32 2004
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districts through increased state responsibility. Efforts to equalize
education funding have pervaded state politics for over 30 years.
Since 1970, every state has tried at least once to equalize school
finances (Hoxby 2001 ). Moreover, good schools are a primary
reason that people choose to live in the suburbs, but education
funding is an issue that resonates in all regions (South and
Crowder 1997).
Education funding presents complicated dilemmas for suburban politicians. On the one hand, suburbanites should favor local
financing of the schools through property taxes, over statewide
sales or income taxes, as the latter require them to foot the bill
for education in less affluent rural and urban areas (Thomas
1998; Schneider 1992). On the other hand, however, high property taxes have been a suburban hot button, since at least the tax
revolt of the late 1970s. A poll of Chicago suburbanites, for example, showed that nearly three times as many respondents were
concerned with the issue of rising property taxes as were worried
about school quality. 1 Suburban politicians, then, may feel pressure to oppose statewide education funding, while trying to ease
their constituents' local tax bills. Emphasizing the latter as a policy goal may lead to conflict between suburban legislators and
those from other regions who fear that property tax cuts will lead
to shifts in funding formulas. Further complicating the picture is
the fact that the actual policy impact of regional redistributi on
through the legislative process is uncertain. While court-ordere d
plans to change education funding formulas have generally reduced inter-district inequality, some redistribution schemes can
actually harm poorer districts as well as wealthier ones (Murray,
Evans, and Schwab 1998; Hoxby 2000).

1
Stanley Ziemba, "Suburban Dream Loses Luster for Many Residents," Chicago Tribune, 26 August 2001, p . 4-1.
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The following sections examine suburban legislators' votes
on school finance issues and contrast them with those of representatives of other regions. The analysis begins with a case study
of Illinois. Illinois was chosen because it is fairly representative
of national trends. According to Barone (2001, 494), "its mixture
of blacks and whites and Hispanics, immigrants and pioneers,
city-dwellers and suburbanites and farmers, the affiuent and impoverished, heavy industry and high-tech, make it a rough proxy
for the nation." No matter how representative, however, single
state case studies are more valid when they include comparisons
to other states (Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2002, 418). Therefore, subsequent sections contrast Illinois' experience with those
of states that differ on relevant cultural, regional, and demographic variables.
The analysis requires that the concepts of "suburb" and "suburban legislator" be clarified. Unfortunately, a consensus definition does not exist (Jackson 1985). Rusk (1995, 6) considers
suburbs to be the areas lying outside the borders of a central city,
but within a metropolitan region, as defined by the U.S. Census
Bureau. Building on this definition, I define "suburban" in the
four states under consideration as the metropolitan area population living outside a central city of at least 250,000. The population restriction focuses the analysis on larger expanses that
include several legislative districts.
Based on this definition it is possible to identify suburban areas for each of the four states in the analysis. For Illinois, the
relevant territory is defined as Cook County outside of Chicago,
as well as seven surrounding counties-DuPage, Grundy, Kane,
Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and Will. In addition, five counties in
the St.Louis metropolitan area-Clinton, Jersey, Madison, Monroe, and St. Clair-fit the definition. Suburban areas of Michigan
are defined as Wayne County, excluding Detroit, and Lapeer,
Livingston, Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, and St. Clair counties.
VOL. 32 2004
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In Georgia, the suburban area consists of Fulton County (excluding Atlanta), plus Barrow, Butts, Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinett,
Henry, Newton, Paulding, Rockdale, Spalding, and Walton counties. Finally, Maryland has suburban areas surrounding Baltimore
and Washington, D.C. For Maryland, the following counties are
included: Baltimore (excluding Baltimore City), Anne Arundel,
Carroll, Harford, Howard, and Queen Anne. The Washington,
D.C. suburban counties are Calvert, Charles, Frederick, Mont gomery, and Prince George's.
All of the designations above are based on U.S. Census Bureau {1992) definitions of metropolitan areas. For Atlanta, Baltimore, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C., the Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) was used. For Detroit, the Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) was the relevant metropolitan
unit, and for Chicago the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical
Area (CMSA) defined the suburban region. Only portions of the
relevant metropolitan regions that are in the four states studied
are included in the analysis.
Suburban legislators are defined as those who represent districts in the counties listed above. Because legislative districts
must be equal in population, many districts span suburban and
urban or suburban and rural areas, however. In such cases, legislators were classified according to where their district offices
were located. In other words, if the office or official address is in
a suburban area, the district is defined as suburban, if not it is
categorized in the appropriate urban or rural category. This approach makes it possible to replicate this study in the many states
where population breakdowns of legislative districts are not
available.
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ILLINOIS CASE STUDY
Background

An individualistic culture, regional conflict, and the legacy of
the Chicago machine interact to shape Illinois' political context.
Elazar (1984) identifies Illinois as an individualistic state where
professional politicians focus on benefiting themselves and their
allies, rather than pursuing an abstract public interest. Quixotic,
or even idealistic, efforts to find statewide solutions clash with
the state's pragmatic parochialism. According to a leading textbook on the state's politics, "good services and good schools
everywhere would be nice, the voters and their leaders seem to
say, but if it means consistently higher tax effort, perhaps the
current system will be good enough after all" (Gove and Nowlan
1996, 218).
Regional conflict has also played a central role in Illinois
politics. Polls indicate that policy preferences differ among rural,
urban, and suburban parts of the state, and that the different areas
exhibit at least a mild distrust of each other's legislators (Nardulli and Krassa 1989). From 1901 to 1955 rural areas held sway,
fending off the growing power of Chicago by refusing to redistrict the legislature (Frank, Nardulli, and Green 1989). After a
population-based redistricting in the 1960s, the existence of the
nation's last viable big city political machine allowed the mayor
of Chicago to dominate legislative decision making for a brief
period (Gove and Nowlan 1996, 43). Through patronage and the
power to slate candidates for higher political offices on the Democratic ticket, the mayor could control the votes of city legislators.
While the death of Mayor Richard J. Daley in 1976 threw the
Chicago machine into turmoil, demographic trends were already
weakening the machine's hold on the state legislature at the expense of the suburbs. In the latter half of the 20th Century, the
VOL. 32 2004
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suburban population eligible to vote approximately tripled, while
the state's overall population grew slowly (Anderson, Blair, and
Landy 1997). Changes in the makeup of the legislature have mirrored these demographic shifts. Between the 1960s and 1990s
Chicago and suburban areas effectively traded places in terms of
levels of representation. During this period Chicago dropped
from over 40% of the seats in each house of the legislature to
barely 25%, while the suburbs gained what Chicago had lost.
School Finance in Illinois

As noted, one expects suburbanites to oppose statewide income or sales taxes to finance education because these taxes
force suburban residents to subsidize other districts. In Illinois,
according to Gove and Nowlan (1996, 177) suburban elected
officials "chafe at appeals that more of their taxpayer dollars be
distributed to Chicago and to downstate schools to reduce disparities in per pupil spending." Further evidence of suburban
opposition to statewide funding comes from voting patterns in a
1992 referendum. The ballot question involved an unsuccessful
effort to amend the Illinois Constitution to place "preponde rant"
(at least 50%) financial responsibility for school funding on the
state government. While the statewide average vote was 57% in
favor, and Chicago residents supported the plan by a margin of
73%, only one of the eight Chicago suburban counties (Kendall)
exceeded 50% support (Illinois State Board of Elections 1992).2
Perhaps, then, it is no surprise that the suburbs' rise to demographic prominence in Illinois coincided with an erosion in state
aid, from 47% of total school funding in 1975 to 27% by the late

2

Rob Karwath and Sue Ellen Christian, "Education Amendment Falling Short," Chicago
Tribune, 4 November 1992, p. 2-1.
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1990s3 (Hovey and Hovey 2000). As a result, dramatic differences in per pupil funding between richer and poorer districts
appeared. Beginning in the late 1980s, the legislature began to
consider various plans to alter school aid. None succeeded, but
examining two prominent legislative efforts in the 1990s allows
a better understanding of the regional dynamics of the education
finance issue, and provides an opportunity to examine the proposition that suburban legislators oppose statewide school funding
mechanisms.
The first plan involved the unsuccessful 1992 effort to amend
the Illinois constitution to require the state to provide at least
50% of total school funding. Table 1 shows a regional breakdown of the legislative vote to put this proposal on the statewide
ballot combining members of both the House and Senate. Legislators were categorized by the area they represent into three
categories: "Chicago," "suburban," and "downstate." Only legislators who voted either ''yes" or "no" were included in the calculations.
The results show that suburban legislators were far less likely
than those from other regions to support an increase in the state's
share of educational funding. While at least 80% of Chicago and
downstate legislators favored state funding increases, only
slightly more than one-third of suburban members did. The table
also breaks down the suburban and overall votes by party. The
results in the table show a clear division between the two parties
that is even more dramatic among members located in the suburbs, as suburban Republicans were especially likely to oppose
the constitutional amendment. While about 30% of Republicans
overall favored the plan, only 10% of suburban Republicans did.
Suburban Democrats' voting patterns essentially reflected the
larger party dynamics, however.
3

Rick Pearson, "Taxes May Trip up School-Funding Panel," Chicago Tribune, 16 July

1995,p.2-1.
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TABLE!
ILLINOIS
COMBINED HOUSE & SENATE MEMBERS VOTING
ON EDUCATION FUNDING, BY CATEGORY
(in percents; raw numbers in parenthesis)
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1992 Constitutional Amendment to Increase State Responsiblity
Yes
No

65
(109)
35
(59)

82
(40)
8
(9)

80
(47)
20
(11)

36
(22)
64
(39)

JO
(4)
90
(38)

95
(18)
5
(I)

29
(21)
71
(51)

92
(88)

8
(8)

1997 Income Tax Increase/Property Tax Cut Legislation
Yes

No

53
(62)
47
(56)

93
(27)
7
(2)

54
(21)
46
(18)

28
(14)
71
(36)

6
(2)
94
(32)

50
(20)
50
(20)

69
(37)
31
(17)

89
(68)
II
(8)

100
(61)
0
(0)

75
(12)
25
(4)

12
(7)
88
(50)

90
(55)
10
(6)

47

99
(96)
I
(I)

40
(29)
60
(40)

1995 Tax Cap Legislation
Yes
No

74
(125)
26
(45)

(7)

53
(8)

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Journal of the Illinois House
of Representatives (1992, 1995, 1997), Journal of the Illinois Senate (I 992, 1995),
Handbook of Illinois Government (1991, 1995, 1997).

In 1997, Governor Jim Edgar proposed a plan to raise personal income tax rates 25% to increase and equalize school aid
and provide some property tax relief.4 This bill passed the House
• Rick Pearson and Courtney Challos, "Senate GOP Passes own School Plan," Chicago
Tribune, 31 May 1997, p. 1-1.
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but died in the Senate Revenue Committee on orders of suburban
State Senate president Pate Philip, who feared that the bill would
pass a floor vote (Wheeler 2003). Table 1 also breaks down the
House vote on this bill by regional and party categories. The results generally parallel those in top rows of Table 1. First, as expected, suburban legislators were less likely to support this
approach than were legislators from other regions. They claimed
that the bill treated their school districts unfairly, because the tax
relief received under the plan would not be enough to insure
funding at current levels for wealthier areas. As one suburban
state legislator, speaking in floor debate expressed it, "I came
here with the idea that I wanted to help other children, but not at
the expense of our own districts. Our homes will not be worth
the money that they were if our education system goes down .... I
cannot understand a system that is essentially going to bankrupt
people that have large mortgages ... and then send our tax dollars
across the state to fund other people" (State of Illinois 1997,
COi-DOI). Second, as was true of the vote on the constitutional
amendment described above, suburban Democrats and Republicans differed greatly in their voting patterns. Specifically, 75% of
suburban Democrats supported the plan, compared to only 6% of
suburban Republicans. In a slight departure from the vote pattern
on the constitutional amendment, however, suburban members
from both parties were less likely than their counterparts from
other regions to support this plan.
In sum, the regional differences in education finance votes
were as expected. Still, there were key differences among Democratic and Republican legislators representing the suburbs,
with Democrats more likely to support statewide funding
schemes. These variations probably reflect the different impact
that statewide funding would have on wealthier or poorer suburban school districts, as suburban Democrats are most likely to
represent "inner" suburbs or older industrial cities that have beVOL . 32 2004
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come incorporated into larger metropolitan areas. In fact, eleven
of the fourteen suburban Chicago Democrats had districts based
in Cook County, which also contains Chicago, and one of the
remaining three represented Joliet, a former manufacturing center. This pattern provides some evidence for the proposition that
a city/inner suburban coalition will occur. At the time of this
vote, Republicans maintained a slight edge, 13-11, in Cook
County House districts, but dominated the Chicago suburbs outside of Cook, 18-3.
Suburban opposition to statewide school funding schemes exists in tension with an aversion to property taxes. One way to
resolve this tension is for suburban politicians to use their increasing numbers to redirect existing funds toward districts they
represent, at the expense of other regions. In Illinois, this scenario has involved efforts to shift state school dollars to well-off
suburban areas through property tax caps. For example, suburban
House Republican leader Lee Daniels stated after the 1994 elections that he wanted to use his newly-achieved position as
Speaker to cut suburban property taxes and replace the lost revenue with more state school aid (Pearson 1994). He achieved partial success the following year with legislation that capped
property taxes in the Cook County suburbs of Chicago. Opponents of the cap included many Chicago and most downstate
Democrats who feared that limiting local support for suburban
schools would, in fact, trigger more aid from state sources.5 As
one downstate legislator argued, "We know that this is going to
allow for many of the school districts in northern Illinois who are
much wealthier than ours to receive some portion of state in-

5

Rick Pearson and Susan Kuczka, "Edgar Makes Plans to Ink Cook Tax Cap," Chicago
Tribune, 9 February 1995, p. 2-3.
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crease, and I lrnow that there is only so much money in the pot''
(State of Illinois 1995, F05).
Table 1 breaks down the vote on tax caps, combining both
houses. It shows that, of the three regions, suburbs gave the
measure the greatest support. Since Republicans from all regions
supported the cap almost unanimously, this result reflects, in
part, Republican numerical advantages in the suburbs (61 to 15
among members voting on this bill). Here again, there are substantial differences between Republican and Democratic levels
of support, with less than half of suburban Democrats voting for
the bill, while all the suburban Republicans did.
To summarize, Illinois' experience suggests that suburban
legislators are less likely to support state-level school funding
plans than are those from other regions, but they are more likely
to favor holding down property taxes. "Inner" suburban Democrats differ from "outer" suburban Republicans in their voting
patterns, with the former more likely to be aligned, but not necessarily in lock step with, predominantly city Democratic legislators. The sections that follow examine voting patterns on school
finance issues in three other states to assess whether they are
comparable to Illinois.
COMPARISON TO MICID GAN

Michigan resembles Illinois in many respects. Both are large,
industrial, rnidwestem states that struggled economically during
the 1970s and 1980s. Similar to Illinois, Michigan politics has
historically featured conflict between Detroit and "outstate" areas (Browne and VerBerg 1995, 36-37). As is also true in Illinois,
legislative power in Michigan is shifting from the city to the suburbs. In the late 1960s, for example, Detroit accounted for about
22% of the members of the House of Representatives, while the
suburbs claimed 28% and outstate areas the remaining 50%. By
the 1990s, Detroit had fallen to 11%, while the suburbs had inVOL. 32 2004
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creased to 35% and outstate areas had also increased to 54%.
Changes in the Michigan Senate have been less dramatic, but
reflect the same general trends. Finally, in the early 1990s, the
two states had similar property tax levels, $914 per capita in Illinois, v. $984 in Michigan (Hovey and Hovey 1997). Michigan
was more dependent on the income tax, however, while Illinois
had higher per capita sales taxes.
There are some other differences between the two states as
well. First, their political cultures vary. Michigan has a history of
more moralistic politics than has been the case in Illinois, leading to a more issue-oriented politics and comparatively high
spending on social programs (Browne and VerBerg 1995, 9-13).
A second difference concerns the statewide political influence of
each state's major city. Michigan does not have the tradition of
boss rule that existed in Illinois, which has limited the Detroit
mayor's influence in the state legislature (Browne and VerBerg
1995, 37). While the Chicago machine was in its heyday under
Richard J. Daley, Detroit was electing a nonpartisan mayor. Finally, unlike Illinois, Michigan made dramatic changes in its
school funding system.
Education finance was a prominent issue in Michigan since
the 1970s. In 1971, Governor William Milliken proposed a property tax/income tax swap, which failed in the legislature.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, voters rejected eight ballot
proposals that would have limited property taxes, usually with a
income tax or sales tax replacement (Kleine, et al. 1992). The
issue became more prominent in the 1990s with the election of
Governor John Engler, who had made property tax reducti on a
central focus of his 1990 gubernatorial campaign (Courant and
Loeb 1997). In 1993, Engler backed a ballot proposal that would
have cut property taxes for schools and replaced them with
higher sales taxes. Opposition in the Detroit metropolitan area
doomed this proposal to defeat. Wealthy suburbanites feared that
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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their schools would suffer under a more state-centered funding
system, while voters in poorer urban areas rejected the sales tax
•
6
as regressive.
Later that year the state legislature altered school financing
by first abolishing the property tax, and then submitting an alternative scheme to the voters. Specifically, the ballot proposal featured a sales tax/cigarette tax increase. If that failed, an income
tax hike to fund education would have automatically gone into
effect.
Table 2 shows the results of each vote for legislators in three
categories, analogous to those used in Illinois: Detroit, outstate,
and suburban. The vote for abolishing the property tax resembles
the results reported in Table I for the Illinois property tax vote.
Suburban legislators were the most likely to support abolition of
the property tax, while city legislators were the least likely to do
so. As in Illinois, the voting patterns of suburban Republicans
and suburban Democrats differed substantially. Suburban Republicans supported the abolition of property taxes almost unanimously, while the suburban Democrats gave it a much narrower
majority. As in Illinois, this result suggests the possibility of a
city/inner suburban alliance. It is also apparent, however, that
Republicans in Michigan are even more united across regions
than Democrats, suggesting that rural/outer suburban alliances
are also possible. Table 2 also reports the Michigan legislature's
vote on the funding source to replace the property tax.As in Illinois, city legislators were most supportive and suburban legislators least so, although the differences are not as dramatic. Also,
suburban Democrats were less likely to support this plan than
suburban Republicans, perhaps because of its regressive overtones. Compared to the property tax abolition vote, suburban
6

Mark Hornbeck, "Engler: Alienated Counties Killed 'A."' Detroit News, 4 June 1993,

p. IA.
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legislators' votes differed less according to party. Finally, the
region's Democrats were much less likely to support the plan
than those from the city, implying that the possible city/inner
suburban alliance apparent on some other votes did not appear in
this instance.
In Illinois, suburban legislators, particularly Republicans, opposed statewide funding while supporting local property tax
caps. In Michigan, a somewhat similar pattern was evident
among suburban GOP members. These legislators, while supporting both property tax elimination and statewide funding,
TABLE2
MICHIGAN
COMBINED HOUSE AND SENATE MEMBERS VOTING ON
EDUCATION FUNDING, BY CATEGORY
(in percents; raw numbers in parenthesis)
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(13)
43
(10)

95
(70)
(4)

46
(30)
54
(35)

62
(13)
38
(8)

74
(55)
26
(19)

74
(42)
26
(15)

Pro11ertyTax Abolition
Yes
No
Sales Tax/Cigarette Tax
Yes
No

72
43
74
(58)
(100)
(6)
28
57
26
(39)
(8) (20)
Alternative Financing
74 100
74
(97) (12)
(55)
26
0
26
(34)
(0)
(19)

77
96
(36) (23)
23
4
(II)
(I)
Proposal
67
71
(30) (17)
35
29
(15)
(7)

5

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Journal of the Michigan
House of Representatives (1993), Journal of the Michigan Sena{e (I 993), and
Michigan Manual (1993).
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were much more likely to favor the former than the latter. Although the two proposals received almost identical levels of support in the legislature as a whole, 96% of suburban Republicans
supported property tax elimination, while only 71 % supported
the alternative financing mechanism.
Ultimately, the proposal to increase sales and cigarette taxes
to replace the now-defunct property tax as an education fmancing source went to the voters in March, 1994. Although, like its
predecessor, it lost badly in Detroit, it did pass statewide and in
suburban areas. The either/or nature of the ballot question, which
would have forced an income tax hike if it were to have failed,
probably explains this outcome, as a more progressive tax would
have hit suburban areas relatively harder. 7 The proposal was
most popular in outstate areas, winning 74.7% of the vote, compared to 69.2% statewide. Not surprisingly, rural areas benefited
the most from this plan. Suburban areas essentially broke even,
while poorer urban areas saw little or no increase in school aid,
but got a net tax increase due to the shift toward the sales tax
(Courant and Loeb 1997).
COMPARISON WITH GEORIGA

In order to achieve further regional and cultural variation, the
third state chosen for comparison is Georgia, a southern state
with a traditionalistic political culture (Elazar 1984). Georgia has
a higher minority population than Illinois or Michigan, a significant fact, because ethnic diversity tends to undermine support for
education spending (Poterba 1997; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly
1999). As in 111inoisand Michigan, reliance on property taxes
and differences between rich and poor districts have been a con7

Mark Hornbeck and Charlie Cain, "Voters Overwhelmingly Back Sales Tax Increase,"

DetroitNews, 16 March 1994, p. I A.
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tinuing problem of the Georgia educational system (Fleischmann
and Pierannunzi 1997, 287). Georgia also has a dominant metropolitan area and a history of regional divisions in the state (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2002). During most of the post WWII era,
these regional divisions have pitted Atlanta against rural areas,
but as has been the case in Illinois, the suburbs have emerged as
a third political force in the last few decades (Fleischmann and
Pierannunzi 1997). Suburban representation in the state legislature is comparable to Illinois, at about 37% in the Senate and
33% in the House in the 1990s. Georgia is less dependent on the
property tax than Illinois, but more dependent on income taxes
per capita. Sales taxes per capita in the two states are almost
identical (Hovey and Hovey 2000).
Beginning in 1985, Georgia operated under a school financing formula known as Quality Basic Education, which critics
viewed as providing less than adequate state support and favoring wealthy districts.8 After entering office in 1999, Governor
Roy Barnes appointed a commission charged with making dramatic changes in the state's education funding system. The following year the legislature acted on recommendations of the
commission, supported by the governor, which increased state
funding for poorer districts and limited aid to some of the
wealthiest districts in the state. To counter opposition to the proposal from some Republican legislators representing relatively
wealthy districts, the plan required a local match before the
poorer districts would become eligible for more state funding,
and increased funding for the majority of school districts.9

8

Doug Cumming and James Salzer, "2000 Georgia Legislature: Barnes Finds Way To
Sweeten Change in School Fund Gaps," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 15 January
2000, p. 1-H; Doug Cumming, "Local Boards Want State to Increase School Funds."
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 24 June 1995, p. 8-C.
9
Doug Cumming and James Salzer, supra.
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Table 3 shows the combined results of the vote on this bill.
Unlike in Illinois, the legislation passed fairly comfortably. Nevertheless, the regional and party patterns are very similar. As was
true in Illinois, suburban areas gave the measure the least support. Once again, there were dramatic differences between voting
patterns of suburban Republicans and Democrats, with slightly
over a third of Republicans supporting the plan and all suburban
Democrats doing so. The fact that the voting patterns of city legislators and suburban Democrats were perfectly in synch in this
case supports the city/inner suburban coalition hypothesis. FinaJly, as was true in Illinois, suburban Republicans were less
likely to support this plan than were members of their party
TABLE3
GEORGIA
COMBINED HOUSE AND SENATE MEMBERS VOTING
ON EDUCATION FUNDING, BY CATEGORY
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statewide, arguing that the bill took away too much control from
10
local districts.
In interpreting Table 3, it is important to note that Georgia's
education reform bill included reform measures that went beyond financing. Thus, it is difficult to be as sure that vote patterns in the table reflect legislative preferences on school funding
issues. It is possible to allay these fears somewhat by examining
a failed Senate Amendment to the bill which would have kept the
existing finance system in place. While losing 19-35, it carried
the suburban region 12-8, while failing badly in the other two.
All of the suburban supporters were Republicans. These patterns
are consistent with those found in Illinois and Michigan.
COMPARISON WITH MARYLAND

Maryland has a political culture that combines traditionalistic
and individualistic elements (Elazar 1989; Barone 2001). It is
distinct from the other three states, however, in that the suburban
areas dominate. Although, like the other states, it has a significant central city (Baltimore), a majority of the state's population
lives in suburban areas. The surban population is reflected in the
legislature, as well. During the 1990s, both houses of the legislature had more than 70% of the members from the suburbs, compared to around 40% in Illinois. Recent research by Gimpel and
Schuknecht (2002) suggests that as suburbs grow, intra-suburban
political battles replace those between other regions as sources of
conflict. For example, education funding battles have pitted legislators from the Washington suburbs against those from the Baltimore area. 11 Maryland has lower per capita property and sales
10
James Salzer, "School Package Passes Senate," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 17
March 2000, p. DI .
.
11
Michael Dresser, "$51 Million School Plan Wins Backing," Baltimore Sun, 14 December 1997, p. IB.
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taxes than Illinois, but higher income taxes, ranking th4"d in the
nation on the latter (Hovey and Hovey 2000).
Like Illinois and the other states discussed above, Maryland
has struggled with the school financing issue for a number of
years. Since 1970, eleven commissions or task forces considered
how to equalize educational funding, but most observers argue
that the incremental changes that have been initiated have only
made the problem worse. 12 Like Michigan and Georgia, Maryland has been more successful than Illinois in changing its funding formula to increase state support. In 2002 the legislature
passed a new system that increased state aid to local districts
35% over five years, financed largely through higher cigarette
taxes, although questions remained about long-term funding stability. The legislation was based on the recommendations of the
most recent study panel, the Thornton Commission, and occurred
in a climate of fear that lawsuits would force action if the legislature did nothing. Baltimore City and rural schools were seen as
the biggest winners from the plan. 13
Table 4 shows a party and regional breakdown of the vote in
Maryland. In contrast to Illinois and the other states, suburbanites were as willing to support statewide funding of schools as
were those from other regions. Suburban willingness to support
statewide funding may reflect the fact that Democrats dominated
suburban districts in Maryland, unlike in the other states. Ironically, despite benefiting from the plan, rural legislators were less
supportive. Maryland's voting patterns were similar to those in
Illinois in the dramatic split between Republicans and Democrats
in the suburbs voted, with the former overwhelmingly opposed
and the latter strongly in favor of funding equalization. Once
12
Howard Libit, "Schools Taking a Second Look at State Aid," Baltimore Sun, 18 June
2000,p . l-B .
13
Howard Libit, "Finding Funds for Education is Next Hurdle," Baltimore Sun, 8 April
2002, p. 1-8.
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again, these patterns are somewhat consistent with a city/innersuburban coalition or rural/outer suburban bloc . The two major
suburban areas had different voting patterns, with legislators
from the Washington suburbs supporting the plan 55-14, while
those from the Baltimore suburbs supported it by a narrower 3230 margin. This result may, however, simply reflect the fact that
Republicans make up a greater proportion of Baltimore suburban
legislators (27 out of 62), than is the case in the Washington area
(11 out of 69).
CONCLUSION

I have examined suburban legislators' voting patterns on
questions related to education finance. In three of the four states
suburban legislators were more likely to oppose statewide school
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financing plans than were those from other regions, even though
this opposition did not always mean that the legislation in question failed. In Illinois and Michigan suburban legislators were
less likely to support more state aid and to oppose higher local
property taxes, as well. These tendencies were especially evident
among suburban Republicans. Although it may seem paradoxical
to oppose both state and local methods of financing education,
the pattern is generally consistent with the predictions made earlier in the article.
The analysis of the four states reveals fairly consistent differences in voting behavior between suburban Republican legislators and their Democratic counterparts. The results imply that the
suburbs are unlikely to become a monolithic, regional power
bloc that dominates state policy decisions. In fact, the findings
are consistent with the view that suburbs are becoming the political battleground of state politics, where both parties vie for
support (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2002).
Overall, then, the results suggest that party may be a relatively more important factor than region in explaining voting
patterns on school funding. In six of the seven votes analyzed,
the differences between the percentages of Republicans and Democrats voting for a bill was greater than the difference between
suburban legislators and any other region. Nevertheless, suburban Democrats' average margin of support differed from their
party's average by at least 5% on four of the seven votes, while
Republicans did so on three. The margin was greater than 10%
on three of the seven votes for Democrats and one for Republicans. Therefore, while party seems to make a bigger difference
than region, region was important on some votes.
The foregoing analysis also implies that Democrats are at
least slightly more likely to let regional interests trump party
unity than Republicans are. Thus, rural/outer suburban coalitions
based in the Republican Party may be more significant than the
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city/inner suburban mergers that some writers on urban politics
anticipate. This result is especially significant, since Maryland is
the only state where Democrats outnumbered Republicans in
representing the suburbs, while the Republicans had a clear numerical advantage in Illinois and Georgia.
Two other points worth mentioning are implicit in the discussion. First, demographic trends and regionalism interact with
more long-tenn characteristics of a state's politics to shape policy. For example, it is probably no coincidence that Illinois was
the least successful in altering school funding mechanisms, given
its individualistic political culture. Second, suburban legislators
can use their power at all stages of the legislative process, not
just on fmal votes. In other words, as they become more numerous and fiII more leadership positions, they will be in a better
position to shape the legislation that comes up for a vote.
Research on more states and issues is necessary before reaching more definitive conclusions. At this point, however, given the
partisan diversity of contemporary suburbs and the some-time
split between inner and outer regions, it appears doubtful that
suburban areas will be able to dominate state government in the
way that some cities and rural areas have in the past. While this
conclusion may be bad news for the suburbs, it probably has
positive implications for state government performance more
generally. When the interests of one region dominate, states may
be less effective in playing the role of domestic policy innovators
that many expect of them in the contemporary federal system.
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